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STANDING IN BETWEEN SEXUAL VIOLENCE
VICTIMS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
THE LIMITS OF TITLE IX
HANNAH BRENNER JOHNSON*
Abstract
Sexual violence proliferates across communities, generally, and is
especially prevalent in places like colleges and universities. As quasi-closed
systems, colleges and universities are governed by their own internal
norms, policies, and federal laws, like Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which address how sex discrimination must be
handled in institutions of higher education that are in receipt of federal
funds. Title IX focuses on all facets of sex discrimination including
reporting, investigation, adjudication, and prevention. When schools are
accused of failing to adequately respond to reports of sexual misconduct on
their campuses, Title IX has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
provide a private right of action by which victims can hold institutions
accountable.
In the most typical cases, one enrolled student accuses another enrolled
student of sexual assault. The university investigates, perhaps holds a
hearing panel, issues a determination after applying the relevant
evidentiary standard, and, where warranted, imposes appropriate
sanctions. If a student victim is dissatisfied with the institutional response,
they have the right to sue the school in federal court. Not all cases follow
this typical example, however, raising the question of who, specifically, is
entitled to avail themselves of the protections of Title IX. Sometimes victims
are visitors or “outsiders” who have been raped or assaulted on campus by
enrolled students. Their right to sue educational institutions has been called
into question by courts that have denied them standing to sue the schools in
federal court.
Historically, some judges have used the standing doctrine to deny access
to the courts to certain minority groups. Victims of sexual violence
* Vice Dean for Academic & Student Affairs and Associate Professor of Law,
California Western School of Law. JD, University of Iowa. I am grateful to Professors Erin
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represent a new addition to this cohort of excluded parties. A growing
number of federal district courts have barred this class of victims from
pursuing their grievances against colleges and universities based ostensibly
on their “outsider” or “non-student” status, and federal appellate courts
have, to date, been reluctant to take a stand either way. A new case that has
emerged along these same trend lines is currently percolating in the Sixth
Circuit, brought by a woman who was sexually assaulted in a dormitory at
the University of Kentucky (UK). The plaintiff in this case was not actually
enrolled at UK but resided in campus housing while attending a community
college per a formal agreement between institutions. When she sued UK
under Title IX for its deliberate indifference in responding to her reported
rape, the trial court dismissed her case without reaching the merits.
Instead, the court used a narrow interpretation of standing, finding that in
order to sue a school under Title IX, an individual must be formally
enrolled as a student or enrolled in a program or activity of that institution.
This distinction between insider and outsider rape victims is wholly
problematic. Colleges and universities, while reliant on the presence of and
tuition generated by their enrolled students, cannot entirely depend on
insiders to succeed. They actively solicit, depend on, and profit from
engagement with outsiders every single day as a means to fulfill their
educational mission. This Article will use Doe v. University of Kentucky as
a point of contemporary illustration (filled in by the decisions of other
similar cases) to argue that individuals who are sexually assaulted on
college campuses should be afforded equal access to Title IX protections
and, specifically, should be granted standing to sue regardless of their
enrollment status.
Introduction
On October 2, 2014, a female college student (Jane Doe) called the
campus police to report that she had just been raped in her dorm room at the
University of Kentucky (UK).1 The law enforcement officer who responded
to the call and investigated the case notified the Director of the Office of
Student Conduct, who was also the acting Dean of Students at the
university, about the incident. 2 Doe filed a complaint under the university’s
Title IX policy, and the university conducted an investigation and

1. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d 620, 621 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
2. Id.
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subsequently held multiple hearings that spanned several years. 3 In total,
the case took nearly two and a half years to make it through the campus
adjudication process.4 During that time, the university rendered multiple
decisions followed by subsequent appeals, and Doe alleged that the entire
process was characterized by unnecessary delays and procedural missteps. 5
Eventually, the final university hearing panel found in favor of the alleged
perpetrator.6
This set of facts formed the basis for Doe’s pursuit of injunctive relief
and monetary damages in the Title IX case Doe v. University of Kentucky. 7
Doe alleged that the school was “deliberately indifferent” in its response to
her report that she was raped. 8 Specifically, Doe argued that “UK’s
unreasonably disorganized and protracted process, its lack of support for
her while she coped with the rape, and its police department’s deliberate
indifference toward her rights in the hearing process deprived her of the
educational benefits and opportunities UK offered to her.”9
Given the prevalence of sexual violence 10 on college campuses, student
victims routinely report incidents just like the one described above, and
their cases are often investigated and adjudicated promptly and efficiently
by their schools. In the most typical cases, one enrolled student accuses
another enrolled student of sexual assault.11 The university investigates,
perhaps holds a hearing panel, issues a determination after applying the
relevant evidentiary standard,12 and, where warranted, imposes appropriate
3. See id. at 621–23. Amid the hearings, criminal charges were filed against the
perpetrator. Id. at 623.
4. See id. at 621–23.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 623.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d 620 (6th Cir.
May 1, 2019) (No. 19-5126), 2019 WL 2029708, at *8.
10. In this Article, I use the term sexual violence to describe many forms of sexual
misconduct that occur along a continuum. I also use the terms sexual violence, sexual
assault, and rape somewhat interchangeably throughout the Article.
11. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2017);
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1231 (D. Colo. 2005), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
12. The evidentiary standard used in Title IX cases is a subject of significant debate.
New regulations promulgated in 2020 by the Department of Education depart from prior
practice by allowing college officials to use either a “preponderance of the evidence or ‘clear
and convincing’ standard, which sets a higher burden of proof.” Greta Anderson, U.S.
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sanctions.13 The legal standard required by Title IX, under which such cases
are evaluated on campuses, is currently in flux given changes in leadership
and departmental policies at the Department of Education. 14 But at the time
of Doe’s case, it was well-settled that a school’s hearings process should
use a preponderance of the evidence standard to evaluate claims of sexual
assault.15 If the outcome of the investigatory process and related hearing
panels is in favor of the complainant, the school may impose a myriad of
sanctions on the perpetrator up to and including expulsion. 16 If a victim is
ultimately dissatisfied with the institution’s response, like Doe was, she can
file a lawsuit against the institution for injunctive or monetary relief,
invoking Title IX’s implied private right of action. 17
Not all cases follow this typical example, however, resulting in a
conundrum as to who is entitled to avail themselves of the protections of
Title IX. Visitors or “outsiders” who have been raped on campus by
enrolled students and who are similarly dissatisfied with the way their cases
have been handled have routinely been denied standing to sue the schools in
federal court. As illustrated in this case, the plaintiff, who was dissatisfied
with UK’s handling of her reported rape, was denied access to justice not
based on the district court’s determination that her case was without
merit—indeed, the court never reached that conclusion—but on her lack of
standing to sue the school in the first place because she was not an enrolled
student.18 Doe is a recent addition to a small but steadily increasing group
of cases that are brought by individuals who are sexually assaulted on
Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 7, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/education-department-releases-final-titleix-regulations.
13. See generally Emily Yoffe, Reining in the Excesses of Title IX, ATLANTIC (Sept. 4,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/title-ix-reforms-are-overdue/569
215/ (explaining Title IX hearings and the commonly used preponderance of the evidence
standard); TEX. TECH UNIV., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT & TITLE IX VIOLATIONS: SANCTION
MATRIX (n.d.), https://www.depts.ttu.edu/studentconduct/PDF-WordFiles/Sexual_Miscon
duct_Sanction_Matrix.pdf (describing applicable sanctions for sexual misconduct).
14. See What Betsy DeVos’s New Title IX Changes Get Right — and Wrong, WASH.
POST (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:20 PM CST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-betsydevoss-new-title-ix-changes-get-right--and-wrong/2018/12/14/a8d485e2-feea-11e8-ad40cdfd0e0dd65a_story.html.
15. See Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in
College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 148.
16. See TEX. TECH UNIV., supra note 13.
17. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 702–03, 717 (1979).
18. See Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d 620, 631–34 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
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college campuses but are not formally enrolled students of that campus.
Courts have been reluctant to extend standing to this class of students. 19
There is historical precedent—dating at least as far back as the Dredd
Scott case—for excluding certain groups from accessing the justice
system. 20 Indeed, the standing doctrine has often functioned as a roadblock
to access the legal system for historically disadvantaged groups, resulting in
a “pattern of injustice.”21 One scholar notes:
Whether it provides a false pretense for politically or
prejudicially derived judicial decisions or prohibits precedentbound judges from deciding on the merits, the standing doctrine
is an enemy to the federal judge’s primary purpose: upholding
justice and the Constitution.22
Although the standing doctrine had not yet been formally developed at
the time Dredd Scott was decided, the Supreme Court relied on a similar
conceptual framework, finding that “there was no judicially cognizable
interest because Scott and his family were not a category of persons
protected by the Constitution.” 23 Over time, it evolved to become a legal
tool that has performed a gatekeeping function. According to one scholar,
“[s]tanding jurisprudence can keep all manner of plaintiffs from seeking
relief.”24
Using Doe v. University of Kentucky as a case study against the backdrop
of other similar opinions involving non-enrolled students who were raped
on campus, this Article continues the exploration of this growing legal
controversy involving the outer boundaries of Title IX.25 In my earlier
research, I analyzed two of the earliest cases that considered the question of

19. See, e.g., K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965,
at *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016).
20. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
21. Douglas Coonfield, Standing in the Way of Justice: How the Standing Doctrine
Perpetuates Injustice in Civil Rights Cases, 37 REV. LITIG. 99, 122 (2018).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 108.
24. Id. at 101.
25. See generally Hannah Brenner, A Title IX Conundrum: Are Campus Visitors
Protected from Sexual Assault, 104 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2018) (advocating to extend Title IX
rights to those who participate in campus life, regardless of official connection to the
university).
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whether campus visitors (non-students) are protected by Title IX. 26 This
Article builds on that research and relies on the recent Doe case to illustrate
how courts are increasingly using the standing doctrine to avoid
engagement with the difficult issue of sexual assault. In effect, the denial of
standing silences victims’ voices and forecloses an important avenue of
justice by precluding access to even argue their cases. It also allows for a
legal loophole through which schools, and even perpetrators of sexual
assault, can avoid liability.
Creating a distinction between insider and outsider rape victims is
wholly problematic. Colleges and universities, while reliant on the presence
of and tuition generated by their enrolled students, cannot entirely depend
on insiders to succeed. These educational institutions actively solicit,
depend on, and profit from engagement with outsiders every single day to
fulfill their educational mission. This Article will use Doe v. University of
Kentucky as a point of contemporary illustration—complemented by the
decisions of other similar cases—to argue that individuals who are sexually
assaulted on college campuses when they are engaged in a school’s broadly
defined programs and activities should be afforded equal access to Title IX
regardless of their enrollment status.
Instead, courts should look closely at whether a victim was engaged in
the school’s programs and activities. This inquiry should be a holistic one
that includes more than just students who are formally enrolled in classes.
This approach is grounded in the reality that colleges and universities, while
somewhat insular entities, derive a significant benefit from their openness
to and engagement with individuals not formally affiliated with the
institution. Drawing distinctions between outsiders and formally enrolled
students for Title IX purposes does not further the goals of making
campuses safer, incentivizing schools to respond appropriately to reports of
sexual violence, or protecting equal access to education. Part One explores
the overwhelming problem of sexual assault on college campuses. Part Two
considers the ways that courts have excluded outsiders from the protections
of Title IX, and finally the Conclusion argues that attaining safer campus
communities demands the dismantling of these arbitrary categories or
classes of victims.

26. See id. at 120–28 (discussing K.T. v. Culver–Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165
CAS, 2016 WL 4243965 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016); Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d
556 (D.R.I. 2017)).
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I. Sexual Assault on College Campuses
Sexual violence has proliferated across communities. The National
Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey found that more than one out
of three women experienced sexual violence involving physical contact at
some point in their lives. 27 Additionally, nearly one in four men
experienced the same.28 Perhaps more striking, nearly one in five women
and one in thirty-eight men have experienced completed or attempted rape
in their lifetimes. 29 The context in which sexual violence occurs, however,
is important to note. Often, sexual violence is perpetrated within the
broader community as captured by the statistics above, but sometimes it
takes place within more insular spaces or systems like prisons, immigration
detention centers, the military, or institutions of higher education. 30 A
research study published in 2000 formed the basis for the well-known
statistic that between “20%-25% of college women and 15% of college men
are victims of forced sex during their time in college.”31 More recently, a
Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation study confirmed this: “Twenty
percent of young women who attended college during the past four years
say they were sexually assaulted.” 32 Despite these staggering statistics, it is
widely thought that “the circle of victims on the nation’s campuses is

27. SHARON G. SMITH ET

AL.,

NAT’ L CTR.

FOR INJURY

PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS.

FOR DISEASE CONTROL & P REVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE P ARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE

SURVEY : 2015 DATA BRIEF-UPDATED RELEASE 2 (Nov. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 1, 3.
30. Hannah Brenner & Kathleen Darcy, Toward a Civilized System of Justice: ReConceptualizing the Response to Sexual Violence in Higher Education, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 127, 139–40 (2016-2017).
31. Statistics, NSVRC, https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737 (last visited May 27, 2020);
see also BONNIE S. FISHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN & MICHAEL G. TURNER, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN, https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf (explaining that the rate of completed or attempted rape of college
women might be between one-fifth and one-quarter).
32. Nick Anderson & Scott Clement, 1 in 5 College Women Say They Were Violated,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5women-say-they-were-violated/?utm_term=.eb788b427d74. “In all, the poll found, 25
percent of young women and 7 percent of young men say they suffered unwanted sexual
incidents in college.” Id. Additionally, “[m]any others endured attempted attacks, the poll
found, or suspect that someone violated them while they were unable to consent. Some say
they were coerced into sex through verbal threats or promises.” Id.
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probably even larger.”33 To this end, another study found that more than
ninety percent of sexual assault victims on college campuses do not report
the assault.34
I have long argued that the context in which sexual violence occurs
matters.35 Many of the dynamics inherent in the perpetration of sexual
violence, like power and control, are the same regardless of the place in
which it occurs, but the related reporting of such violence and the response
of the institutions related to investigation, prosecution, and punishment vary
widely and are shaped largely by the specific setting. Sociologists and
others draw distinctions among systems (identifying such systems as
“closed”) based on factors such as how insulated they are from the broader
community.36 Colleges and universities are similar to traditional closed
systems like prisons, immigration detention centers, and the military
because they are set apart to some degree from the broader community and
are subject to their own rules, laws, and norms. A traditional closed system
is characterized by significant independence from the outside world, such
as a place where people live or work, where most issues are resolved
internally.37
Like traditional closed systems, colleges and universities are governed
by their own norms, internal policies, and by special federal laws like Title
IX. Despite these similarities, colleges and universities also differ from
traditional closed systems in important ways. They are better described as
quasi-closed institutional systems 38 because while they do in fact embody a
certain insularity, they also rely in large part on the free flow of people into
33. Id.
34. See FISHER, CULLEN & TURNER, supra note 31, at 23.
35. See generally Hannah Brenner, A Title IX Conundrum: Are Campus Visitors
Protected from Sexual Assault, 104 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2018); Hannah Brenner, Kathleen
Darcy & Sheryl Kubiak, Sexual Violence as an Occupational Hazard & Condition of
Confinement in the Closed Institutional Systems of the Military and Detention, 44 PEPP. L.
REV. 881 (2017); Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s One Size Fits All
Response to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301 (2013); Hannah
Brenner, Beyond Seduction: Lessons Learned About Rape, Politics, and Power from
Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Moshe Katsav, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 225 (2013).
36. Brenner, Darcy & Kubiak, supra note 35, at 889. This term is one created by Erving
Goffman and refers to places of isolation, where people live and work, like prisons. Id.
(citing Erving Goffman, The Characteristics of Total Institutions, in ORGANIZATION AND
SOCIETY 312, 314 (1961)).
37. Daniel Katz & Robert L. Kahn, Organizations and the System Concept, in CLASSICS
OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 347, 356 (Jay M. Shafritz et al. eds., 8th ed. 2016).
38. Brenner & Darcy, supra note 30, at 140–41.
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their space. However, they are not entirely closed off from the outside
world like prisons or other traditional closed systems.
Instead, colleges and universities both actively solicit and depend on
engagement with visitors and other “outsiders” as a way to fulfill their
educational mission. Such outsiders might include: fans attending sporting
events, members of the public attending guest lectures, high school students
being recruited into athletic programs, visiting scholars, youth attending
summer camps, patients seeking medical treatment from university
physicians, and much more. Consequently, the distinction between insider
and outsider has taken on a new significance in recent years as it relates to
Title IX’s extension of protections. This Article argues for an extension of
the same protections to all who engage in campus life—regardless of
student status.
II. The Exclusion of Campus Visitors from the Protections of Title IX
Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as a
way to address discrimination based on sex within higher education
programs that receive federal funds.39 When Title IX was originally
enacted, its primary focus was on ensuring access to education for women.
According to Title IX: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 40
Since its inception almost fifty years ago, Title IX has been interpreted
through caselaw to include a private right of action for individuals who
have experienced sex discrimination. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,
the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action under Title
IX.41 Later, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Schools, the Court held that
money damages are available upon a showing of an intentional Title IX
violation.42

39. For a comprehensive overview of Title IX Supreme Court Jurisprudence, see
generally Gabrielle Fromer, Brittany Mosi & Allison Nelson, Sexual Harassment in
Education, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 451 (2016).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
41. See 441 U.S. 677, 702 (1979).
42. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

24

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:15

Today, liability can be imposed when an institution is found to be
deliberately indifferent to reports of sexual violence. 43 The Supreme Court
further evolved the standard for pursuing a private cause of action through
its decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.44 In
Gebser, the Court held that a school can be liable when an official “has
actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s
misconduct.”45 Additionally, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
extended the Gebser holding to include peer-based harassment.46 The Davis
Court reached this decision because of the school’s deliberate indifference
to student-on-student sexual harassment which was “so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victim’s access to
an educational opportunity or benefit.”47 This standard still applies in Title
IX cases today. “[A] school and its offending program can both be punished
financially under Title IX for violating a student’s right to an education
without sexual harassment and be subjected to an individual’s private suit
for money damages under Title IX.” 48
Although the standard governing Title IX cases brought by victims of
sexual assault is fairly clear as illustrated by recent case law, 49 the question
of whether a non-enrolled student has standing to bring a lawsuit is not so
well-settled. To be sure, most of the Title IX cases brought by individuals
who were dissatisfied with how the school responded to their experience as
a victim of sexual violence involve enrolled students of those institutions. It
has only been in recent years, and in relatively small numbers, that nonstudent victims of sexual assault have filed lawsuits.
43. See, e.g., Erin Buzuvis, Title IX and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s
Potential to Hold Education Institutions Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual
Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 40 (2020).
44. 524 U.S. 274, 292–93 (1998) (holding that students may bring private causes of
action against schools if they experience sexual harassment by teachers and the schools have
actual notice of and are deliberately indifferent to the misconduct).
45. Id. at 277.
46. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
47. Id. at 633.
48. Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 560 (D.R.I. 2017).
49. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d 620, 626 (E.D. Ky. 2019). There are
three prima facie elements for a Title IX claim arising from “student-on-student sexual
harassment”: (1) the harassment is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it
deprives the Plaintiff access to “educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school,” “(2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, and (3)
the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.” Id. (citation omitted).
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A. Non-Student Victims
One of the most recent cases in this subset, Doe v. University of
Kentucky, mentioned earlier in this Article, is currently on appeal to the
Sixth Circuit and is illustrative of the conundrum of who is actually entitled
to protection. 50 The case was initiated by a woman who was sexually
assaulted in a dormitory at UK.51 The plaintiff in Doe was not actually a
student attending UK, but she was a part of the campus community,
residing in the dormitory while attending a community college, per a formal
agreement between institutions.52 Jane Doe was raped in her dorm room 53
and followed campus protocols by reporting and filing a grievance with the
university. 54 Her case took almost two and a half years to make its way
through the university judicial process. 55 A total of four hearings were held;
the first three resulted in a finding for Doe, and the alleged perpetrator
appealed each of those decisions. 56 Doe was dissatisfied with the way the
case was handled by UK and, therefore, sued the university under Title IX
for its deliberate indifference to her report of sexual assault.57 The trial
court, however, dismissed her case without reaching the merits because it
applied a narrow interpretation of standing. The court held that a plaintiff
must be enrolled as a student or enrolled in a university program or activity
(narrowly defined) for purposes of pursuing a Title IX cause of action.58
The individual who allegedly assaulted Doe was a UK student. 59 Though
Doe lived on campus and was involved in campus life, she was not
technically a student at the university. 60 Doe was not enrolled in an official
UK degree program, but she did reside in the school’s dormitory and had
50. See generally Brenner, supra note 25.
51. Doe, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
52. See id.
53. Id. Residence halls are the most common place on college campuses where sexual
assaults take place. For a comprehensive discussion of the existing research surrounding
residence hall rapes, see Andrea A. Curcio, Institutional Failure, Campus Sexual Assault
and Danger in the Dorms: Regulatory Limits and the Promise of Tort Law, 78 MONT. L.
REV. 31, 33, 37 (2017) (arguing for greater transparency about the prevalence of assaults in
dormitories to assist in prevention).
54. See Doe, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
55. See id. at 621–24.
56. Id. at 622–23.
57. See id. at 623.
58. Id. at 634.
59. See id. at 621–22.
60. Id. at 621.
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access to the campus community in the same way as students who were
enrolled did. 61 Pursuant to a cooperative agreement, Bluegrass Community
and Technical College students, like Doe, could live in the dormitories at
the University of Kentucky, access the university’s athletics, dining, and
health center facilities, and participate in many aspects of campus life, like
student government.62 The agreement also provided a pathway through
which students who began their studies at the community college could
eventually earn a degree from UK. 63 Further, plaintiff’s brief submitted to
the Sixth Circuit noted that Doe’s dorm room rental agreement required her
to follow “the University Student Code of Conduct” and “UK’s Policy on
Sexual
Assault,
Stalking,
Dating Violence,
and Domestic
Violence” because Doe was a “member of the University community.”64
Doe’s status as an outsider created a real conundrum for the trial court,
which ultimately held that she could not sue the university for its flawed
response following her assault. The Eastern District of Kentucky granted
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Doe
lacked standing to sue65 but at least appeared to take this question seriously.
In fact, the court recognized the importance of this question by holding the
case in abeyance and granting the parties the opportunity to conduct limited
discovery and submit supplemental briefs. 66 Despite the extra time devoted
to this all-important question, the court ultimately did not find for Doe:
“Since Plaintiff has failed to show she was either a UK student or enrolled
in a UK education program or activity, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the
present action under Title IX, and the Court need not consider Defendant’s
arguments regarding the first three disciplinary hearings.”67
Moreover, the district court cited the First Circuit’s position in Doe v.
Brown University as part of its discussion to establish who is protected by
Title IX but rather than relying on it, quickly dismissed that opinion without
much explanation. The court acknowledged that the First Circuit found that
“members of the public who avail themselves of university services and
participate in university activities, such as libraries, computer labs, campus
61. See id.
62. Id. at 631–32.
63. Id. at 630.
64. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 9, at 4–5, 2019 WL 2029708, at *4–5
(internal quotation omitted).
65. Doe, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 634.
66. Id. at 625.
67. Id. at 634.
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tours, public lectures, and sporting events, ‘are either taking part or trying
to take part of a funding recipient institution’s educational program or
activity.’”68 But the district court in Kentucky disagreed. The court
reasoned that “while some students may utilize the services and participate
in the activities described above, the foregoing services and activities are
‘not synonymous with “education” as contemplated by Title IX.’”69
A handful of federal district courts have similarly denied standing to
non-student victims of sexual violence. In K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College,
a high school soccer recruit sued the school for its handling of her
complaint after she was raped on campus. 70 K.T. had been invited to visit
the school’s campus as part of an “athletic activity” that was “sponsored
and promoted by Culver-Stockton College.”71 During her visit to the
school, K.T. was sexually assaulted at the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity
house.72 Although K.T. was not enrolled at the university, she reported the
incident to law enforcement and tried to file a complaint under the school’s
Title IX policy.73 Despite her report, Culver-Stockton College never
commenced an investigation. 74 As a result, K.T. filed a lawsuit against the
school predicated on a theory of deliberate indifference under Title IX for
its “response to the alleged assault” and its “failure to investigate and
provide guidance, counseling and treatment.” 75
The district court found for Culver-Stockton College, holding that K.T.
lacked standing to sue the school because she was not enrolled there as a
student.76 In doing so, the court rejected the plaintiff’s position that “any
person invited to visit a college campus [has] standing to sue for studenton-student harassment under Title IX.”77 The court reasoned that accepting
the plaintiff’s position “would impermissibly expand the law’s scope
beyond the limited right of action recognized by the Supreme Court.”78 The
68. Id. at 632 (quoting Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 132 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018)).
69. Id. at 632–33 (quoting Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 523 F. Supp.
2d 952, 973 (D.N.D. 2007)).
70. K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *1–2.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
76. Id. at *6.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the lower court’s opinion and refused to engage the question of standing for
a non-student to sue under Title IX.79
Though differing factually, another case similarly looked to the language
of Title IX to refuse a non-student visitor standing. In Doe v. Brown
University, a woman who was a student enrolled at another school filed suit
against Brown after she was sexually assaulted by three student football
players.80 After meeting at an off-campus bar, the football players allegedly
drugged and later sexually assaulted her in a Brown University dormitory. 81
Months after the assault, Jane Doe contacted both Brown University and
local law enforcement and attempted to file a complaint under Brown
University’s Title IX policy on sex discrimination. 82 Brown initially agreed
to pursue an investigation into her complaint under the student code but
refused to do so under Title IX. 83 As a result, Jane Doe filed a lawsuit, but
was ultimately unsuccessful: the district court found in favor of Brown
University. 84
Because the question of non-student standing in a Title IX lawsuit was a
question of first impression, the court looked to the legislative history of the
act to determine whether a non-student can sue an institution. 85 According
to the district court, “Congress intended Title IX to protect against
discrimination of students admitted to the offending school.”86 Moreover,
the court was persuaded by judicial precedent, which has generally reserved
Title IX protection for enrolled students of the recipient school.
Specifically, the court referenced Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, in which the Supreme Court stated that a school may be liable
when its institutional deliberate indifference subjects its students to sex
discrimination.87
Though the district court acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations
of sexual violence on the Brown University campus, the court stopped short
of allowing the case to proceed. It reached this “difficult conclusion”
79. K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017).
80. Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 558 (D.R.I. 2017).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (“Brown informed her that it never completed the inquiry concerning her assault
and abandoned any disciplinary action against the three Brown students.”).
84. Id. at 564.
85. Id. at 561.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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because, in the court’s view, “laws put into place to protect students from
sexual discrimination in educational programs were not meant to address all
instances of sexual assault occurring in the college environment.”88
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
ruling. 89 The appeals court was unwilling to consider the issue of standing
and instead looked directly at the merits of the case. Here, the First Circuit
reached a similar conclusion as did the Eight Circuit in Culver-Stockton
College, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a plausible Title IX
claim. 90
B. The Standing Problem
Throughout history, some judges have controversially used the standing
doctrine to deny access to the courts to certain minority groups. 91 Victims
of sexual violence represent a new addition to this cohort of excluded
parties, and this trend should be taken up by other scholars. Unfortunately,
federal district courts have barred these victims access based ostensibly on
their “outsider” or “non-student” status,92 and federal appellate courts have
been reluctant to take a stand either way—punting the decision-making by
refusing to address it head on. 93
In this way, perhaps the lower court’s decision in Doe v. University of
Kentucky is not all that surprising, considering “the standing doctrine is one
of the most widely theorized and criticized doctrines in U.S. law.”94
Scholars have studied the doctrine and expressed widespread critique of its
application. One scholar, in particular, has posited that “the standing
doctrine is so scattered, so full of divergent contrary opinions and
noncommittal dicta, that it resembles less a legal guideline and more a
88. Id. at 564.
89. Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 2018).
90. Id. at 131. For a discussion on the procedural hurdles facing Title IX plaintiffs who
do have standing, see generally Sarah L. Swan, Procedural Discriminatory Dualism: Title
IX and Campus Sexual Assault, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 69, 76-81 (2020).
91. Coonfield, supra note 21, at 122.
92. Brenner, supra note 25, at 95 (citing Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 560
(D.R.I. 2017); K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016)).
93. See, e.g., Doe, 896 F.3d at 131; K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057. Perhaps the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Doe v. University of Kentucky will finally resolve this conundrum.
94. Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?
An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 591
(2010).
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Jackson Pollock piece.”95 Consequently, the standing doctrine “means what
the viewer brings to it,”96 which leaves the doctrine vulnerable to farreaching discretion.
Moreover, standing is relatively easy to define but more difficult to
apply. Historically, courts did not use the modern language of standing.
Instead, early cases used “common expressions” to determine standing,
focusing on whether an injury was “direct” and “redress[able],” whether a
party to the suit was “a party in interest,” and whether the interest at issue
was “‘personal’ to the plaintiff.”97 Now Article III standing requires an
injury-in-fact that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.”98 Because of this sprawling and inconsistent case law, what
remains in the debate surrounding standing is the “animating principle of
inclusion”99 that lies in the justices’ subjective notions as to what standing
should govern. In other words, most justices agree on the definition but
differ in the analysis, which continues to evolve over time.
As explained by Professor Re, as well as other scholars, standing often
devolves into a relativistic inquiry.
[S]tanding is often made available on a relative basis. The
frequently critical variable, in other words, is where the
particular plaintiff before the court stands as compared with the
range of potential plaintiffs capable of raising the same claim for
relief. This relativistic inquiry discloses “superior” plaintiffs—
that is, plaintiffs with the greatest stake in obtaining the
requested remedy. In short, the Court’s standing decisions (but
not its stated reasons) often adhere to what might be called a
“most interested plaintiff rule.”100
Although non-student victims of sexual assault were not contemplated by
this legal scholar in his assessment of relative standing, the phenomenon is
ever-present amongst this particular group of plaintiffs. To be sure, the
most obvious individuals to bring a private right of action under Title IX
95. Coonfield, supra note 21, at 112.
96. Id.
97. Ho & Ross, supra note 94, at 625.
98. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal quotation
omitted) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
99. Ho & Ross, supra note 94, at 625.
100. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1195–96 (2014).
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are enrolled students. But their obviousness does not mean they are the only
group of possible plaintiffs. Indeed, college campuses consist of and benefit
from a myriad of both insiders and outsiders. The fact that the judiciary
prioritizes one group of rape victims over another for purposes of access to
the courts suggests that there is an inherent superiority—one that should be
dismantled.
Historically, victims of sexual violence have not been treated the same as
other crime victims. Victims of sexual violence are routinely disbelieved
and often blamed for what happened to them. 101 Indeed, many rape myths
proliferate our discourse and culture.102 Part of the reason why access to the
legal system via Title IX or tort law is essential for rape victims stems from
the abject failure of the criminal justice system to adequately respond to
complaints.103 Writing about how standing is used to deny access to the
courts for other under-represented groups, one observer explains,
“Sometimes, bias is harmful and must be pointed out in order for litigants to
get a fair shake. The first step toward eliminating the problems caused by
the doctrine is to recognize the doctrine is inherently flawed and
untenable.”104
This Article is an important preliminary step toward public recognition
of how the denial of standing to non-student victims of sexual violence is
not just unfair, but results in the creation of powerful, systemic
impediments for victims of sexual violence seeking justice. If the judiciary
fails to recognize that the standing doctrine is “[o]ne of the greatest tools at
a judge’s workbench that allows them to avoid issuing a controversial
ruling on the merits” then its search for justice will be frustrated. 105 In order
to effectively address the issues that plague modern society, courts must
decide cases on their merits and overcome “political and personal

101. Beverly Engel, Why Don’t Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward Sooner?,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/thecompassion-chronicles/201711/why-dont-victims-sexual-harassment-come-forward-sooner.
102. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review,
18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133, 134 (1994); Katie M. Edwards et al., Rape Myths: History,
Individual and Institution-Level Presence, and Implications for Change, 65 SEX ROLES 761,
763–68 (2011).
103. It is also true that the criminal law provides a limited remedy to victims of sexual
violence and access to the civil system of justice opens up other avenues of redress (i.e.,
monetary and injunctive relief).
104. Coonfield, supra note 21, at 112.
105. Id. at 101.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

32

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:15

pressures” preventing these important cases from “being decided unjustly—
or not decided at all.”106
Conclusion
Prisons and the military are quintessential examples of closed
institutions. If colleges and universities were quintessential closed
institutions, they would not depend on or invite outside participation to
carry out their mission. As discussed in Part I, one of the significant
characteristics of higher education that argues for its characterization as
quasi-closed is the reliance on outsiders for it to thrive as designed. 107
Students benefit from guest lecturers, exchanges with students from other
schools, and the expertise of visitors from other countries. Meanwhile,
faculty members give presentations on their books and share their latest
research to the broader community. Although colleges and universities are
bound by their own unique rules and norms and exist somewhat like
communities within a broader community, they require a steady stream of
outsiders to meet their stated educational objectives.
One can only speculate why the University of Kentucky extended access
to its residence halls to non-students. Perhaps the motivation was largely
financial. If the university has dormitory rooms available that are not used
by current students, it derives a financial benefit from renting them rather
than letting them sit open. This is but one example of how financial
considerations drive open the campus doors to outsiders.
There is also an additional consideration that the residence hall
arrangement allows for a connection to the university from students
enrolled in community college courses. Those students may be more likely
to select UK as their four-year school of choice rather than transferring
elsewhere. In fact, there exists a pipeline program from community college
to UK that encourages this trajectory. Creating distinctions between
students and non-students for purposes of the protections of Title IX
amounts to nothing more than arbitrary line-drawing with no legitimate
explanation other than to avoid liability. The line may well need to be
drawn somewhere, but the student/non-student distinction does not
adequately address the nexus between an individual and the institution. Is a
community college student who lives in the UK dormitory with a roommate
106. Id. See generally Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Corporate Sex Crimes,
73 OKLA. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2020).
107. See supra Part I.
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who is officially enrolled at the school any less connected to the school for
purposes of Title IX protection?
These judicial opinions reflect a larger, and more dangerous, trend of
judges avoiding “politically controversial or inconvenient questions of law”
by using the standing doctrine. 108 This trend in Title IX cases is continuing.
In the days before this article went to press, yet another court dismissed a
case brought by a non-student rape victim against a university on grounds
that she lacked standing. In Arocho v. Ohio University, a high school
student attended a “career day” program at her high school where she met
an Ohio University police officer who was participating in the program. 109
The student alleged that following their introduction, the officer raped her
on numerous occasions including on the Ohio University campus. 110 After
the university refused to investigate or otherwise address the victim’s
complaint, she filed suit under Title IX, alleging the school acted with
deliberate indifference toward her report of rape.111 In the final part of its
opinion, the court conceded that the plaintiff’s allegations were
“horrendous” but nonetheless dismissed the case, denying her standing
based on her non-student status.112 It is likely that similar cases involving
non-students will continue to make their way through the courts as long as
universities and colleges continue to include outsiders in campus life.
One of the goals of Title IX is to maintain safety on campuses and ensure
that students are guaranteed access to education. 113 These goals, which are
inherently intertwined, cannot effectively be met when schools arbitrarily
choose whom they should and should not protect. A university educates
students in the classroom, to be sure, but the reach and breadth of its
educational mission goes far beyond those four walls, and so too should its
protections. A student living in the residence halls, exercising in the
facilities, and using student services can reasonably be construed to be
participating in the “programs and activities” of the school. Perhaps rather
than drawing a line between students and non-students, the courts should
108. Coonfield, supra note 21, at 102.
109. Arocho v. Ohio Univ., No. 2:19-CV-4766, 2020 WL 3469223, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
June 25, 2020).
110. Id.
111. Id. at *1–2.
112. Id. at *5.
113. Even if broadly applied, Title IX is not a perfect solution to address the widespread
problem of campus sexual assault and other options may better serve the desired end. See,
e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 891, 911–
12 (2016).
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develop an objective test to evaluate whether and when a non-student is
sufficiently engaged with a school to trigger the protections of Title IX. 114
Students may have an obvious nexus to the school but so too do other nonstudents who actively participate in aspects of campus life.
If on appeal the Sixth Circuit ultimately denies Jane Doe the opportunity
to sue the University of Kentucky for mishandling her rape case under Title
IX, the net effect will be to give schools a path to avoid liability whenever
non-students are sexually assaulted. Protecting some of the people on
campus but not all of those who are engaged in campus programs and
activities does not lead to safer campus communities. It may also function
in practice to give perpetrators a free pass to choose their sexual assault
victims wisely since institutions will have little incentive to follow through
with investigations related to sexual assaults perpetrated against nonstudents. An individual who assaults a non-student who happens to be
living in the residence halls, or be attending a campus event may not face
institutional accountability and will likely be free to continue on with their
education without consequence. Meanwhile, the campus is no safer. Title
IX jurisprudence should evolve to better respond to the realities of campus
rape.

114. While beyond the scope of this Article, I will pursue this idea in a subsequent
project.
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